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Resolution Mechanisms of the  
Transnistrian Conflict 
CRISTINA VACARU 
 
 
 
 
 
The end of the Cold War which entailed the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
had created an enormous potential for the outbreak of violence in the former Un-
ion republics which had been finally materialized in the appearance of the intra-
state conflicts. Moldova was caught into the framework of such a conflict that over 
the time had not ceased to exist even if its initial violent character was hampered. 
The so-called ”frozen conflicts” are presenting a major security issue at a local 
level, but also at a regional level. The Black Sea region recently began to gain a 
more important role on the international arena. The concerns towards the evolu-
tion of this region were raised by the enlargement of the European Union and also 
NATO enlargement. Thus, this region which is marred by conflicts needs to be-
come a more stable one through finding a final viable solution to be addressed to 
these separatist conflicts. 
Transnistrian conflict had drawn attention upon it of the third party actors 
which had involved themselves in the process of conflict resolution through the es-
tablishment of a clear mediation mechanism. In this study I would identify the im-
plications of these actors in their search for the establishment of a final political set-
tlement and I would consequently present their record of the envisaged proposals. 
Such a comprehensive approach is required in order to determine why these reso-
lution mechanisms had failed to advance a workable solution. This failure had con-
tributed to the maintenance of the conflict for more than a decade and this reality 
stresses even more the need for such an analysis. 
History, Causes and the  
First Mediation Attempts 
The Transnistrian conflict was brought by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
There are numerous causes of this conflict and the history of the region is impor-
tant in this view. The territory between Prut and Dniester Rivers, which represents 
a part of nowadays Republic of Moldova, has been known as Bessarabia, begin-
ning with the year 1812 when it was annexed by the tsarist Russia. Bessarabia had 
been a part of the Moldova principality and its population has been largely Ro-
manian. In 1918 Romania had regained the control of this region through its uni-
fication. In October 1924 was created the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic, with the capital at Balta, which comprised the territory between Dni-
ester and Bug Rivers, known as Transnistria. As the Soviet Union didn’t recog-
nize the unification of the Bessarabia with Romania, the creation of this republic 
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was suspected as being the initial step towards the annexation of Bessarabia. On 
28th of June 1940, as the consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Bessarabia 
had been seized by the Soviets. On 2nd of August 1940 the Soviet Union decided to 
create the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) out of some regions of the 
Bessarabia (the North and the South of the Bessarabia were given to Ukraine) and 
six districts of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR). For 
a short time, Romania had apprehended the region due to the advancement of the 
Axis powers, but the Soviet Union regained this region in 1944. Thus, Transnistria 
was formed by the will of the Soviets1. 
The origins of the Transnistrian conflict are to be found in the late 1980’s Gor-
bachev’s reforms. The glasnost and perestroika had raised in the Union republics the 
problem of insufficient democratization and had triggered the formation of na-
tional liberation movements. These movements had brought the adoption by the 
Moldovan Supreme Soviet on 31st August 1989 of a law that had made the Moldo-
van (Romanian) language in Latin script the official language of the state. The Rus-
sian minorities and especially those from Transnistria, which were concentrated in 
urban areas, perceived all these actions as a threat to their positions and identity, 
and consequently had formed their own movement, the United Council of Work 
Collectives (OSTK). On 23rd of June 1990 Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic had 
adopted a Declaration of Sovereignty. Transnistrian leaders didn’t approve the ac-
tions of the Moldovan Popular Front and declared ”Transnistrian Moldovan Re-
public” on 2nd September 19902. The so-called ”Transnistrian Moldovan Republic” 
is a de facto state situated on the left bank of the Dniester River, a region of the east-
ern Moldova, which represents 12% of the total territory of Republic of Moldova or 
approximately 4000 square kilometers3. 
The next step towards a fully independent republic was marked by the presi-
dential elections which were held on 8th of December 1991. Mircea Snegur had 
been elected president4. The separatist enclave had refused to participate in these 
elections and had organized its own elections, before the elections in Moldova. 
Through these elections the separatists had claimed legitimacy for their regime5. 
On 27th of August 1991 Republic of Moldova declared its independence6. 
The unrecognized regime, which controls the left bank of the Dniester River, 
claims to represent the interests of ethnic Russians who are in their view the ethnic 
majority. Ethnic component of this region however proves that these claims are un-
founded because 40% of the population are Moldavians, 28% Ukrainians, and only 
                                                    
1 Oleg SEREBREAN, Va exploda Estul? Geopolitica spaţiului pontic, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 
1998, pp. 115-118. 
2 Charles KING, ”Eurasia Letter: Moldova with A Russian Face”, Foreign Policy, no. 97, 
Winter 1994/1995, pp. 106-120; Daria FANE, ”Moldova: Breaking Loose from Moscow”, in Ian 
BRUMMER, Ray TARAS (eds), Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1993, pp. 121-153.  
3 Mihai GRECU, Anatol ŢĂRANU, Politica de epurare lingvistică în Transnitria, Studiu 
elaborat în cadrul Institutului de studii politice şi militare ULIM, Chişinău, 2005, in 
http://www.studiidesecuritate.ro/pdf/Grecu,%20Taranu%20%20Epurare%20lingvistica%20 
in%20Transnistria,pdf.pdf. 
4 Marian ENACHE, Dorin CIMPOEŞU, Misiune diplomatică în Republica Moldova: 1993-1997, 
Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2000, pp. 49-53. 
5 Daria FANE, ”Moldova: Breaking Loose…cit”.  
6 Marian ENACHE, Dorin CIMPOEŞU, Misiune diplomatică...cit., pp. 70-72. 
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about 25% Russians (according to the data of 1989 census)1. An ethnic reason to 
this conflict can be claimed when speaking of the Soviet policy of Russification or 
Sovietization, which had brought a considerable number of ethnic Russians and 
Ukrainians to this region, while displacing the Moldavians by sending them to Si-
beria and Kazakhstan. The Russians were encouraged to settle in Moldova by of-
fering them high positions in the administration of MSSR and they were mainly 
encouraged to come to the Transnistrian region2. 
The Tiraspol regime had defied Chişinău leaders by participating in the Union 
referendum (17 March 1991), which was to decide the maintenance and the refor-
mation of the Soviet Union3. 
Clashes between Moldovan police and Transnistrian forces took place as early 
as in November 1990. In March 1992, the events had lead gradually to the outburst 
of the civil war. The numerous cease-fire agreements which were established be-
tween the two parties, during this period, were violated by one or another of the 
parties. The conflict achieved its peak in June 1992 in the battle for Bender city. The 
Moldovan forces were defeated by the Transnistrian paramilitary troops, which 
were supported by the Russian 14th Army that intervened in the conflict on the side 
of Transnistrian forces4. At the end of the conflict the numbers of victims rose to 
300 killed people and to more than 1000 of wounded men and the majority of vic-
tims were registered on the Moldovan side5. 
The Russian officials didn’t recognize their direct implication in this conflict, 
but the facts came to present another reality. The number of Transnistrian forces 
was impressive. The secessionists were supported by Cossacks and also by the 
highly organized force of the 14th Army. The Transnistrian paramilitary troops 
were heavily armed and these arms were also provided through an indirect sup-
port of the Russians. During the conflict, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, had 
transferred the 14th Army under the direct Russian command (1st of April 1992) and 
this action has raised more intensely the problem of the 14th Army involvement in 
the conflict and also the problem of its withdrawal from the Moldovan territory6. 
At CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, later known as 
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE) Helsinki Confer-
ence held on 23rd of March 1992, the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine, Moldova, Russia 
and Romania had expressed their willingness to form a quadripartite mechanism for 
a peaceful resolution of the conflict. On 6th of April, the Foreign Ministers of these 
countries had gathered in Chişinău and had token a first step towards the conflict 
resolution by signing the Quadripartite Declaration on Resolution of the Transnistrian 
Conflict. The declaration had established a set of basic principles which were meant 
to guide the further negotiations: the respect for the sovereignty, independence 
and integrity of the Republic of Moldova; the adherence to the peaceful resolution 
of the conflict; the right of Republic of Moldova to take appropriate actions to 
                                                    
1 Silviu COSTACHE, ”Transnistria: radiografia unui conflict”, Geopolitica. Revistă de geografie 
politică, geopolitică şi geostrategie, Anul II, nr. 7-8 (3/2004), 2004, pp. 227-232. 
2 Iulian CHIFU, Basarabia sub ocupaţie sovietică şi tentative contemporane de revenire sub tutela 
Moscovei, Politeia-SNSPA, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 204; Silviu COSTACHE, “Transnistria...cit.”. 
3 Daria FANE, ”Moldova: Breaking Loose…cit”. 
4 Charles KING, Moldovenii: România, Rusia şi politica culturală, D. Stanciu transl., Editura Arc, 
Chişinău, 2002, pp. 195-197. 
5 Silviu COSTACHE, ”Transnistria...cit.”. 
6 Iulian CHIFU, Basarabia sub ocupaţie sovietică...cit., pp. 206-214. 
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maintain the order; the non-intervention of an external organization or force in the 
internal affairs of the country. The Foreign Ministers of the four countries had also 
established a series of institutions which had the goal of building trust in the region. 
A second meeting of the quadripartite Commission had been held on 17th of April in 
Chişinău and it had discussed the report of the observers group. In this meeting had 
been approved five documents which could be resumed to the following important 
provisions: each of the countries had the right to send in the region 40 observers 
which had the task to supervise the halting of military actions, which was scheduled 
to begin on 20th of April; in the case of the failure of the observer mission, it must 
have been replaced with a peacekeeping mission. The resolutions of the quadripar-
tite mechanism had failed because the separatist leaders were reluctant to engage in 
this mechanism. On 25th of June at a meeting that addressed to the issue of coopera-
tion within the countries of Black Sea Basin, in Istanbul, the four countries had again 
established a decision on the immediate cessation of fire and also had approved the 
establishment of a security zone. This meeting had also for the first time addressed to 
the solution of the establishment of a statute for the Left Bank districts. The chiefs of 
states of the four countries had also agreed to address an appeal to the CSCE in order 
to ensure its participation to the resolution of the conflict1. 
The quadripartite mechanism was doomed to fail because Russia had engaged 
in a campaign of direct talks with the Moldovan authorities, which was conducted 
by Vice-President, Alexandr Rutskoi2. 
The mediation efforts of Alexandr Rutskoi had materialized into the so-called 
Yeltsin-Snegur Convention, which was signed by the Russian and Moldovan Presi-
dents on 21st of July 1992. Mircea Snegur and Boris Yeltsin met in Moscow and con-
cluded the Convention on Principles of Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the 
Transnistrian Region of Republic of Moldova. The Convention was largely a cease-fire 
agreement that had also established a Unified Committee of Control which had to 
supervise the activity of the peacekeeping troops3. This agreement brought to an 
end the hostilities between the parties and established a security zone along the 
Dniester River. The peacekeeping forces were provided by six troops from Russian 
Federation, three troops from Moldova, and three troops from Transnistria4. 
After the cease-fire agreement the parties engaged in seeking viable solutions. 
The Moldavians had drafted a solution in late 1992-early 1993. In the proposal of 
Transnistrian self-governed territory they were willing to grant to ”Transnistrian 
Moldovan Republic” an extensive autonomy. Transnistrian Moldovan Republic 
Supreme Soviet had replied to this initiative by approving a resolution on 6th Janu-
ary 1993, which saw the solution in a Moldovan confederation formed by the 
Transnistria, Găgăuzia, and the remaining districts of Moldova5. 
In 1993, in Chişinău had been established a permanent mission of the Commis-
sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later known as Organization on 
                                                    
1 Gheorghe E. COJOCARU, Politica externă a Republicii Moldova: Studii, Ediţia a 2-a, revăzută 
şi adăugită, Editura Civitas, Chişinău, 2001, pp. 78-97. 
2 Ibidem, pp. 101-105. 
3 Convenţia cu privire la principiile reglementării paşnice a conflictului armat din zona nistreană a 
Republicii Moldova, Anexa 39, 21 iulie 1992, in Marian ENACHE, Dorin CIMPOEŞU, Misiune 
diplomatică...cit., pp. 400-401. 
4 Charles KING, Moldovenii...cit., pp. 198-199. 
5 Pal KOLSTO, Andrei MALGIN, ”The Transnistrian Republic: A Case of Politicized Regio-
nalism”, Nationalities Papers, vol. 26, nr. 1, March 1998, pp. 103-128, in http://proquest.umi.com/. 
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Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE). The OSCE had elaborated a possi-
ble solution in December 1993. Its report had stated that a settlement in the form of 
a confederation or recognition of the secessionist region was not acceptable, but it 
emphasized that the region could achieve considerable autonomy through the 
creation of a Special Region of Transnistria, which would have its own govern-
ment, legislative body, and Supreme Court. The proposal also sustained that the 
powers should be separated between three types: central, regional and mixed juris-
diction. It has also been recommended to the Moldovan authorities to grant to 
Transnistria the possibility to break from Moldova in the case of the unification of 
Moldova and Romania. The report in fact was proposing a federation1. The in-
volvement of the OSCE mission as a mediator in the conflict had brought a new 
mechanism in the negotiation process. 
On 28th of April 1994, Igor Smirnov, the Transnistrian leader, and Mircea Sne-
gur, the President of Republic of Moldova, had signed a joint declaration at which 
Russia and OSCE had participated as assisting parties. The declaration had insisted 
upon the fact that the future negotiations would seek a viable political solution be-
ginning with the necessity to ”define the legal-state statute of Transnistria”2. 
The negotiation on the issue of the special status for the Left Bank region be-
gan as early as on 28th of October 1994, but it had proved as being a very hard 
problem to be solved3. 
The negotiations continued with a meeting in Tiraspol on 15th of February 
1995. The leaders of the ”Transnistrian Moldovan Republic” had insisted during 
this meeting that they do not want to consider as a solution the attribution to 
Transnistria of a special statute and they demanded from the Moldovan side an of-
ficial recognition of the ”Transnistrian Moldovan Republic”. The delegation from 
Chişinău had refused this proposal, firmly reiterating its adherence to the solution 
that would envisage a special statute4. 
In April 1995, the Moldovan side had submitted to Transnistrians a draft law 
on the special status of the region. The law took into account the recommendations 
of the OSCE and proposed the maintenance of the ”development and expression of 
the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious distinctiveness of the region’s popula-
tion”. The Transnistrians did not expect to receive such a proposal and they had 
not succeeded in giving a proper answer. On 5th of July 1995 Snegur and Smirnov 
met on a new round of talks. Although they did not agree upon a final solution, 
they signed some other important agreements, as the Agreement on Non-use of Force 
as well as a banking agreement5. 
On 8th of May 1997 was signed the Memorandum on the Normalization of the Rela-
tionship between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria. The memorandum was 
meant to redress the situation that occurred in 1995 when the negotiations were 
blocked. This memorandum had also officially installed the mechanism of five-sided 
format of the negotiation process, under which Russia and Ukraine had acquired 
                                                    
1 Steven D. ROPER, ”Federalization and Constitution-Making as an Instrument of Conflict 
Resolution”, Demokratizatsiya, vol. 12, nr. 4, Fall 2004, pp. 527-540, in http://proquest.umi.com/; 
Pal KOLSTO, Andrei MALGIN, ”The Transnistrian Republic…cit.”. 
2 Declaraţia Comună Snegur-Smirnov, Anexa 11, 28 aprile 1994, in Marian ENACHE, Dorin 
CIMPOEŞU, Misiune diplomatică...cit., p. 339. 
3 Charles KING, Post-Soviet Moldova, The Center for Romanian Studies, Iaşi, 1997, pp. 84-86. 
4 Marian ENACHE, Dorin CIMPOEŞU, Misiune diplomatică...cit., pp. 130-131. 
5 Pal KOLSTO, Andrei MALGIN, “The Transnistrian Republic…cit.”. 
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the status of guarantor states and OSCE– the status of mediator (article 1 and 6). In 
the second article the memorandum had addressed to the necessity of the establish-
ment for the Transnistria of a status, which had to begin to be drafted immediately 
after the signing of this memorandum and the parties would have to take into con-
sideration the previous agreements signed in this process. The memorandum had 
also had a few provisions in the third article which were consistent with the problem 
of Transnistria’s special status, because it had established some of its future compe-
tences in a federation: Transnistria would have the right to participate in the conduct 
of Moldova’s foreign affairs when the foreign affairs matters would indulge its inter-
ests; Transnistria would also have the right to set up ”international contacts in eco-
nomic, scientific and cultural fields”. The memorandum was emphasizing that the 
negotiations would proceed from the preservation of Moldova’s integrity as being a 
”common state” within internationally recognized borders. Having the previous ex-
perience of the convenient interpretations of the documents, Moldova’s delegation 
had insisted upon some guarantees which were to be given by Russia, Ukraine and 
the OSCE in sustaining the explanation of the treaty in some special annexes. Al-
though these types of annexes were obtained, the Transnistrian authorities had never 
recognized them. Transnistrian authorities had viewed the document as being ad-
vantageous for them, because the expression ”common state” could be interpreted as 
not necessarily overruling the solution of a confederated state1. 
A new round of discussions had been held in Odessa, on 20th of March 1998. 
There were concluded a series of accords that ensured the gradual demilitarization 
of the security zone and the access to the bridges over the Dniester River. The par-
ties had signed a Convention which was meant to build trust and security and en-
visaged the admission to the conflict zone of Ukrainian peacekeepers with the stat-
ute of observers2. 
The OSCE Plan 
On 2-3 of July 2002 Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE had offered to the parties a 
detailed draft of the so-called Kiev Proposal or OSCE Plan, which was meant to re-
new the negotiations. The plan described the federalization of Moldova. In the 
fourth article of this draft was specified that Moldova would be formed of 
”state-territorial entities”, which were to be given local powers over a series of 
matters, but however this entities were to have an inferior status as related to the 
central Moldovan government. The document didn’t specify how many entities 
had to be included in the federation. This fact has raised numerous controversies 
within the Joint Constitutional Commission (JCC), which was established in Febru-
ary 2003 by the President Vladimir Voronin and it comprised three representatives 
from each party. Although at the beginning there were some proposals to include 
in the federation two entities (Găgăuzia and Transnistria), the discussions however 
had resumed to the admission of a single entity, Transnistria. The debate was 
focused on the stability of a federation based only on two entities. The Venice 
                                                    
1 Memorandum privind principiile normalizării relaţiilor dintre Republica Moldova şi Transnistria, 
Anexa 40, 8 mai 1997, in Marian ENACHE, Dorin CIMPOEŞU, Misiune diplomatică...cit., 
pp. 402-403; Charles KING, Moldovenii...cit., pp. 203-205. 
2 Boris STRATULAT, ”Reuniune la Odesa”, Moldova şi Lumea, nr. 3-4, 1998, pp. 2-3. 
Resolution Mechanisms of the Transnistrian Conflict 911 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VI • no. 4 • 2006 
Commission as well as some Moldovan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
were opposing the formation of a federation based on two subjects, precisely be-
cause of the instability it could have triggered. OSCE’s Mission to Moldova had 
also stated in a previous report, as early as in 1993, that a federation formed of 
even three entities would be a loose federation. OSCE also suggested that for 
achieving an unbiased structure within a Moldovan federation it is necessary that 
the territory of Moldova should be divided in no less than eight to ten regions1. 
The document had also addressed the issue of the military power of the par-
ties and it had stipulated that the two armies, the Moldovan army and the Trans-
nistrian forces, would be unified in a single army of the future federation. The 
document in this case also left some unresolved questions because it did not spec-
ify the method for the unification of the two armies neither it did specify a clear pe-
riod of time under which this unification would take place. The document pro-
vided that the two actors had to diminish the number of their forces and had to 
take steps that might have brought more confidence between the parties: the an-
nouncement of the units’ movements and the announcement of the military exer-
cises. The fact that the period of time of the unification of the two forces was not 
fixed might have caused a legalization of the Transnistrian army. The Transnis-
tria’s forces were perceived on the international arena as illegal forces, paramilitary 
troops, and the text of this document had altered this view because it had put in 
the same framework the illegal troops of Transnistria and Moldova’s legal forces2. 
The document had provided that each state-territorial entity could have its 
own legislative and executive bodies and its own Constitution. A clear delimitation 
of competences had to be made, under the agreement’s provisions, in a negotiation 
between the state-territorial entities and the rump Moldova. Kiev Proposal had pre-
sented as a basis for the future negotiations three types of competences: the compe-
tences of the federal center that included the foreign affairs, defense, state security, 
citizenship, criminal justice, emission of currency, customs control, control over the 
state property; the competences of state-territorial entities which largely included 
the control of this entities on a local level through a series of competences; and the 
shared competences that were reduced to the protection of human rights and to 
the guarantees of the ethnic minority rights. The document had stated that such 
federal competences as customs, national currency and commercial laws would re-
quire a period of transition in order to be applied in the state-territorial entities, but 
as in the case of the unification of the two forces the period of transition was unde-
termined, because the text overlooked to mention its interval. Even if the foreign 
affairs were considered to be a field controlled by the federal center, the draft how-
ever envisaged that Transnistria might participate in the implementation of inter-
national agreements which were consistent with Transnistria’s interests. This pro-
vision had given to Transnistria an instrument of pressure over Moldova and it 
also might have blocked Moldova’s orientation towards the West. The provisions 
of the document which dealt with the problem of the official language had raised 
numerous criticisms, because even if the official language of the federation was 
                                                    
1 Steven D. ROPER, ”Federalization and Constitution-Making as An Instrument of Conflict 
Resolution”, Demokratizatsiya, vol. 12, no. 4, Fall 2004, pp. 527-540, in http://proquest.umi.com/. 
2 Adrian POP, Gabriela PASCARIU, George ANGLIŢOIU, Alexandru PURCĂRUŞ, România 
şi Republica Moldova – între politica europeană de vecinătate şi perspectiva extinderii Uniunii Europene, 
in http://www.ier.ro/PAIS/PAIS3/RO/ST.5_RO_Final.PDF. 
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Moldovan language written in Latin script, the state-territorial units had the right 
to use the languages which were spoken in their regions along with the official lan-
guage. This provision might have brought the installment in Transnistria of the 
Russian language as an official language. The draft established a bicameral Parlia-
ment, which had to be composed from 101 members. The Legislative Chamber had 
to have 71 members and they were to be elected through the votes of the popula-
tion of the whole country. The Representative Chamber had to include 30 members 
and they were to represent the ”state-territorial entities”. The bicameral Parliament 
had raised another controversial issue which was included in the article 26. In the 
opposition’s view this article granted to the Transnistrians a right of veto over all 
basic federation’s laws because it stipulated that ”state-territorial entities are repre-
sented in the Chamber by an equal number of votes”. Thus, the Representative 
Chamber had the real power in enacting the laws, while the Legislative Chamber 
in order to pass a law had to have more than a simple majority1. Debates between 
the two sides were also raising problems on such topics as finances, judiciary and 
taxes. Transnistria required the establishment of two separate judiciaries, which 
were to be arbitrated by a joint mediation court, consisted of an equal number of 
judges from each subject. Besides this fact, Transnistria sustained that it also 
should preserve its own criminal and civil codes. The representatives of the Left 
Bank region were also insisting that Moldova should recognize their achievements 
in privatization. This privatization however lacked any legal basis and if Moldova 
had approved its recognition it might have lost a significant income2. 
The plan had to be mediated by Russia, Ukraine and OSCE and the three par-
ticipants had to form a system of ”guarantees”. Russia, Ukraine and OSCE as guar-
antors had the right to monitor the implementation of the plan on constitutional and 
legislative levels. They had to observe the work of the institutions and the guarantors 
had also the right to mediate the disputes that might surface in this process between 
the federal center and the state-territorial units. The decisions taken by guarantors 
had preeminence over the federation’s decisions. This system had in fact installed 
the right to interfere in the internal affairs of an independent state and the independ-
ence of Republic of Moldova was established by its Constitution in the first article. 
The OSCE Plan through many of its controversial provisions was to empower the 
Transnistrian separatism and to deepen the conflict3. The fact that the OSCE Plan was 
supporting the Transnistrians was confirmed by Tiraspol ”Foreign Minister”, Valeri 
Litskai, who had declared that this plan was representing Transnistria’s victory. The 
plan was clearly drafted under the Russian influence because it reproduced on a ma-
jor scale the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Russia would 
have had established its influence through the system of guarantees because it was 
represented as guarantor state, but it also had a representation within the OSCE in-
stitutions and also because the system did not include an eventual accession of other 
European states. Thus, the plan was to endanger Moldova’s reintegration and was to 
entail the legitimization of Transnistrian regime4. 
                                                    
1 Vladimir SOCOR, September 11 and the Geopolitical Revolution of our Time, Editura 
Universitară Politeia-SNSPA, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 276-278. 
2 Steven D. ROPER, “Federalization and Constitution-Making…cit.”. 
3 Adrian POP, Gabriela PASCARIU, George ANGLIŢOIU, Alexandru PURCĂRUŞ, România 
şi Republica Moldova...cit. 
4 Vitalie CIOBANU, Anatomia unui faliment geopolitic: Republica Moldova, Editura Polirom, 
Iaşi, 2005, pp. 225-227. 
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The Kozak Memorandum 
In November 2003, Russia took the initiative in proposing a plan that envis-
aged another Constitution for the creation of a Moldovan federation. This plan, 
the Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of A United State in 
Moldova, was an exclusive creation of the Russian Federation and it was better 
known as the Kozak Memorandum, because it was promoted by Dmitri Kozak, an 
influential person of the Putin’s team. The memorandum proposed a federation 
compounded of two units (”Transnistrian Moldovan Republic” and Găgăuzia) 
and a federal territory, consisted of the remaining Moldovan territory. The Fed-
eration as stated in the preamble of the memorandum was to represent a ”neu-
tral, demilitarized state” and it had to be created within the 1990 borders of the 
Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (article 1). In the first article the federation 
was also declared as an independent and unified state. This project was consid-
ered to represent an ”asymmetric federation”, because the federal territory had 
to have a consistent number of powers as compared to the other two subjects. 
However the powers of the federation were separated into three categories: fed-
eration’s competences, the subjects’ competences and joint ones. The draft Con-
stitution had offered too many joint competences and this could be considered as 
a prospect for the governments failure. The third article in its seventh chapter 
had included a controversial provision that had legitimized the use of the Rus-
sian language in Republic of Moldova saying that Russian would be considered 
”an official language”, while Moldovan would have the status of ”state lan-
guage”. Besides this, the article had also provided that the subjects of the federa-
tion would have the right to institute other official languages in their own Con-
stitutions. The subjects of the federation had the right to establish their own leg-
islative, executive and judicial bodies and also had the right to have their own 
Constitution, tax system and their own budget. The memorandum had also in a 
way approved the privatization done by the Transnistrian unconstitutional re-
gime, because it didn’t approve an eventual re-examination of laws on ”state, 
municipal and private property”, which were passed in Transnistria before its ac-
cession to federation. The Parliament was to be composed of two houses, the 
Senate and the House of Representatives, and this had raised the problem of a 
possible overrepresentation of minorities in the Senate. The Senate was formed of 
26 senators of whom 13 were elected by the House of Representatives, 9 were 
representatives of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet and 4 were representative of 
the Găgăuz National Assembly. Most of the laws had to be passed through the 
Senate and the federal laws required a substantial majority in the Senate (a ¾ ma-
jority). This fact amounted to practical veto power of the minority and it certainly 
contradicted the concept of an asymmetric federation. The veto power of the Sen-
ate was at least to be exercised in the approval of federal organic laws until 2015. 
Thus, a minority group had been able to block any law which concerned the joint 
competences. It could have had the power to block the legislation that might 
bring Moldova closer to European integration. The same problem of the overrep-
resentation of the minority groups was raised by the structure of the Federal 
Constitutional Court (six judges were representing the lower house, one- Gă-
găuzia and four-Transnistria). The adoption of a decision by the Constitutional 
Court at least until 2015 also required a substantial majority which amounted to 
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no less than 9 votes and this provision had, as in the previous case, empowered 
the minorities to block any decisions1. 
Vladimir Voronin, the Moldovan President, had recognized the plan as being 
a viable solution saying that it is a ”realistic, compromise scheme” that would 
bring to an end the problems of the republic. The Transnistrian authorities were 
also pleased with the provisions of this plan, but they however had insisted on the 
inclusion of some adjustments in the plan. The first requirement of the Transnis-
trian side was to legitimize the Russian military presence on the territory of 
Moldova for another 30 years, under the so-called military guarantees. The second 
provision demanded for the Russian language the status of a state language. The 
international community was mainly concerned with the fact that the Kozak Memo-
randum didn’t provide any system of international guarantees. The protests organ-
ized by Moldovan opposition parties, the concerns expressed by OSCE, United 
States and European Union had persuaded the Moldovan President to do not ac-
cept to sign this plan2. 
Belkovski Project 
Russians had failed in imposing the Kozak Memorandum as the final political so-
lution for resolving the Transnistrian conflict, but this fact had not meant that they 
had renounced to draft and promote other proposals. Such a proposal appeared as 
early as in June 2004 and it came from Stanislav Belkovski, the Director of the Rus-
sian National Strategy Institute. The Belkovski Project proposed the recognition of an 
independent Transnistria and the unification of Moldova with Romania. Stanislav 
Belkovski had sustained that such a plan was accepted by the Russian President, 
Vladimir Putin. The proposal was in many instances interpreted as a Russian diver-
sion, because Russia knew that its implementation was not possible. The plan didn’t 
establish a clear mechanism through which these two provisions could have been 
materialized. The proposal might have deepened the security problems in the re-
gion because it would have entailed the preservation of the Russian troops in an in-
dependent Transnistria. The presence of the Russian army could have created a 
kind of ”Black Sea Kaliningrad” which was to represent a neighbor of NATO and 
European Union. If the provision which entailed Moldova’s unification with Roma-
nia was to be implemented, it could have raised serious problems for Romania’s ac-
ceptance as a full member of the European Union. Romania’s integration in the 
European Union, in its better case, would have been delayed if it were to incorpo-
rate a region which was considered to be an unstable one. Russia through this plan 
had largely reasserted its position of an imperial power, because it didn’t consult 
Republic of Moldova’s authorities on the provisions which were included in it. 
However, this plan had also created some positive effects for the Republic of 
Moldova. This plan through the unification provision had unofficially recognized 
                                                    
1 Russian Draft Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of A United State in 
Moldova, 17 November 2003, in http://www.peacebuilding.md/library/13/en/7_ Memorandum_ 
Nov_2003_eng.doc; Michael EMERSON, Should the Transnistrian Tail Wag the Bessarabian Dog?, 25 
November 2003, in http://www.ipp.md/public/comentarii/34/ro/MoTransRev.doc. 
2 http://www.e-democracy.md/en/e-journal/20031203/#51. 
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that Moldova’s people have Romanian origins. Consequently, the theory of 
”Moldovan language” and ”Moldovan people” which had been propped up by 
Russians beginning with the Stalin regime was dismantled1. 
Youshtchenko Plan 
In 2005, Ukraine had decided to take an active position in the promotion of a 
viable solution to this conflict and it had proposed at the five-sided negotiations 
held in Vinnitsa, on 16-17 May, a plan. This plan was supposed to continue to de-
tail a draft proposed at GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) sum-
mit held in Chişinău on April 22. However the Plan on the Resolution of the Transnis-
trian Problem2, also known as Youshtchenko Plan, departed considerably from the 
initial ”seven steps” plan. This proposal comprised a solution to be applied in 
three stages and as the Kozak Memorandum contained provisions which were detri-
mental to Moldova. In the first chapter the drafters of this plan had unofficially rec-
ognized that some of the provisions of the plan went in contradiction with the 
Moldovan Constitution, because it provided that the special legal status of Trans-
nistria would be offered preserving ”Moldova’s constitutional system” (article 2). 
The concept of the constitutional system can be interpreted, because it does not 
mean that it equals with the concept of the Moldovan Constitution. In the third 
chapter the document had established the use in Transnistria of three official lan-
guages: Moldovan, Ukrainian and Russian. The language issue, as I had previously 
noted, was at the basis of the violent outbursts that lead to the civil war and this 
provisions would only enhance Transnistria’s position by conserving its negative 
attitude towards the Moldavians or Romanians, which would eventually bring to 
another serious clashes. This draft provided an unofficial recognition of the exist-
ing Transnistrian regime, because the Transnistrian leaders had to sign it as an 
equal part and this fact raised Transnistria to the status of a state. The plan also 
raised the problem of the right to self-determination of the Transnistrians in case 
Moldova would lose its sovereignty or independence. This provision could eventu-
ally block the access of Moldova to European integration, but it also questioned 
which citizens could be considered as being Transnistrians. Another difficult issue 
was raised by the fact that it established a system of international guarantees and 
this could further bring an eventual intervention of such actors as Russia and 
Ukraine in Moldova’s internal affairs. The plan also provided that in Transnistria 
the regime could be changed only after holding democratic and free elections 
monitored by international observers. The plan overlooked to mention the means 
by which a democratic context should be build in the region and it also ignored the 
fact that democracy can’t be achieved within an autocratic regime. The recognition 
of the newly elected Transnistrian Supreme Soviet by the Moldavian authorities 
would also be in fact an unofficial recognition of Transnistria, precisely because 
there is no a real guarantee that this Supreme Soviet would substantially differ 
                                                    
1 Vitalie CIOBANU, Anatomia unui faliment geopolitic...cit., pp. 363-366; ***, Transnistria: evo-
luţia unui conflict îngheţat şi perspective de soluţionare, Institutul „Ovidiu Şincai”, Bucureşti, 
septembrie 2005, in http://www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Raport_Transnistria.pdf. 
2 Ukrainian Plan for Settling the Transdniestrian Conflict, in http://www.ipp.md/files/ 
Comentarii/Yushchenko_plan_eng14.doc. 
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from the current unconstitutional Transnistrian regime. Thus, a real democracy in 
the region could only be met after the reintegration of the Moldovan state. You-
shtchenko Plan stipulated that Moldovan Parliament should commit itself to pro-
vide by the end of the July 2005 a law on the basic principles of the Transnistrian 
region’s statute. The warring fact in this provision was that the basic principles 
proposed by Kiev were aiming at instituting a Moldovan confederation1. 
”Three D Strategy” Plan 
While the Russian and Ukrainian mediators were promoting federalization, 
the Moldovan civil society was advancing the ”Three D Strategy” Plan, which is 
aiming at a full reintegration of the secessionist region with Moldova through ”de-
mocratization, decriminalization and demilitarization”. The democratization of the 
region should promote the creation of a strong civil society, which could in turn 
bring the formation of an opposition. OSCE and other international organizations 
had to involve themselves more actively in a democratization process. OSCE’s tacit 
acceptance of the Russia’s leading role in the Transnistrian conflict resolution proc-
ess, especially through its acceptance of Russia’s draft documents, had drawn nu-
merous criticisms upon OSCE mission. The OSCE involvement in the democratiza-
tion of the region could endorse this view and it could bring positive results, which 
would overrule the manipulation of people in this region by the current regime 
through the creation of an independent press and a strong opposition movement. 
The democratization should also be promoted only together with the process of the 
decriminalization, because a criminal regime could halt the democratic process. 
The demilitarization issue is a prominent factor in this strategy, because the with-
drawal of the Russian troops would no more provide a serious support to the 
Transnistrian criminal regime. Besides the retreat of the Russian 14th Army, the de-
militarization should entail also the dismantling of the security system created by 
Russia and the transformation of the so-called Russian ”peacekeeping” mission 
into an international peacekeeping mission. The international peacekeeping mis-
sion should not be a military one as the Russian ”peacekeeping” mission is, but a 
civilian mission that would include lightly armed military observes provided by 
the active participation of the whole Euro-Atlantic community2. 
The Recent Developments  
in Transnistrian Conflict 
The process of Transnistrian conflict management was continued with an ini-
tiative undertaken by Vladimir Voronin, the President of the Republic of Moldova, 
which had presented to the Moldovan Parliament a law project. On 22nd of July 
                                                    
1 Oazu NANTOI, Planul de reglementare a problemei transnistrene, propus de partea ucraineană-pro 
şi contra, 8 June 2005, in http://www.ipp.md/comentarii1.php?l=ro&id=38. 
2 Vladimir SOCOR, ”Democratizare, decriminalizare, demilitarizare”, Jurnal de Chişinău, 
1 iunie 2004, in http://jurnal.md/. 
Resolution Mechanisms of the Transnistrian Conflict 917 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VI • no. 4 • 2006 
2005, the Moldovan Parliament had adopted the Law on the Basic Principles of the 
Special Legal Status of the Localities of Transnistria (no. 173-XVI). The project of such a 
law had also been envisaged in the Youshtchenko Plan. Even if the law approved by 
the Moldovan Parliament had had as a starting point some provisions of the You-
shtchenko Plan, it however had also entailed some substantial differences. The law 
had stipulated the reintegration of the Republic of Moldova and it had been 
drafted in accordance with the provisions stipulated by the Republic of Moldova’s 
Constitution. The fact that in the law was clearly expressed the term Republic of 
Moldova’s Constitution was the first substantial change of the Ukrainian plan be-
cause the latter had only employed such a vague concept as the constitutional sys-
tem of the Republic of Moldova. The law had provided the creation of a Transnis-
trian autonomous territorial unit and thus, it had altered another provision of the 
Youshtchenko Plan which was offering to Transnistria the status of an autonomous 
republic. The legislative body of the future autonomous territorial unit would be 
represented by the Supreme Council and it would be elected ”on the basis of free, 
transparent and democratic elections”. The law had explained which elections 
would be considered as democratic elections. It had been pointed out that such 
elections can only occur after the democratization and demilitarization of Transnis-
tria. These two concepts were signalling the acceptance by the Moldovan authori-
ties of some ideas of the ”Three D Strategy” Plan constructed by the Moldovan civil 
society and it accepted the fact that a real democratization of Transnistria can only 
occur if Moldova’s sovereignty is accepted on the whole territory of the republic. 
The law had also provided that the special legal status of Transnistria would also 
be approved by a law which would be drafted within a period of six months. An 
important provision of this law, which was aiming to a certain extent to realize the 
demilitarization, was envisaging the retreat of Russian peacekeeping forces until 
31st of December 2006. The Transnistrians had interpreted the law as an ”ultima-
tum” and this declaration was supported by the argument that the law was drafted 
without any consultations of their opinion on its provisions1. 
Upon the insistence of Moldovan authorities on a more active involvement of 
European Union in the resolution of the conflict, European Union had promoted a 
memorandum on the creation of a European Union Border Assistance Mission. The 
border assistance mission had to operate at the Moldo-Ukrainian border in Trans-
nistrian region and its purpose was to halt the illegal flow of goods, weapons and 
drugs through this border. Ukraine was initially reluctant to the Moldovan initia-
tive of establishing a joint control on Moldo-Ukrainian border, but after the Euro-
pean Union’s involvement it had signed along with the European Commission and 
Republic of Moldova the memorandum for the border assistance mission (7th of 
October 2005). However, subsequently Ukraine had delayed its actions on estab-
lishing an effective control on the Moldo-Ukrainian border, despite the fact that it 
had approved a range of documents in this sense2. 
On 26th-27th of September 2005 in Odessa the negotiations on the conflict had 
moved to a new step by enlarging its format. The new format had included in its 
framework United States and European Union which had acquired the statute of 
                                                    
1 http://ro.altermedia.info/cealalta-romanie/parlamentul-moldovean-acorda-transnistriei-
statut-de-unitate-teritoriala-autonoma_2524.html. 
2 Oazu NANTOI, Transnistrian Conflict: What Could the European Union and the United States of 
America Do?, 21 November 2005, in http://www.ipp.md/public/comentarii/39/en/ 
Transnistrian%20Conflict-EU%20and%20SUA_Engl29.doc. 
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observers in the process of negotiation of the Transnistrian Conflict. However the 
subsequent negotiations held on 15 December 2005 and on 26-27 January 2006 
didn’t bring a substantial advancement in negotiations and this fact was largely 
due to a common stance promoted by Russia and Ukraine. On 15th of December 
2005 Russian and Ukrainian Presidents had presented a joint declaration which 
had marked their main directions in the process of the negotiation of Transnistrian 
conflict. The declaration stated that Russia and Ukraine would ”coordinate their 
steps” in their subsequent decisions upon the resolution of this conflict. Ukraine 
had in this manner approached itself to the Russian view on the solutions for the 
Transnistrian conflict and it could be said that it had renounced to the ideals pro-
moted by the ”orange revolution”. In the Joint Declaration, Vladimir Putin and 
Victor Youshtchenko had adhered to the principles of the previous agreements 
which were signed between the parties during the process of negotiation. The only 
relatively positive statement in this declaration refers to an unofficial recognition 
of the two Presidents that the Transnistrian conflict is not an inter-ethnic one be-
cause they had stated that on the left bank of Dniester River as well as on its right 
bank leave the same peoples, ”Moldavians, Russians and Ukrainians”, but the fact 
that they had also included in this phrase the Russians and the Ukrainians might 
be interpreted as a justification of the future interventions for the protection of 
these minorities. The Russian and Ukrainian Presidents did not spoke in their dec-
laration about the law passed by the Moldovan Parliament in July 2005 and they 
had said that they would accept in the region only an international mission of ob-
servers under the OSCE auspices. They also had mentioned the important role and 
efficiency of the existing peacekeeping mission and through this statement they 
had rejected the Moldovan proposal of the replacement of the current peacekeep-
ers with an international peacekeeping mission. Besides this, they had emphasized 
that the current mission could only be transformed in a ”guarantor peacekeeping 
mission under the OSCE aegis”. This new concept of ”guarantor mission” raises 
the question of its meaning which could in the end entail the consequence of the le-
gitimization of Russian military troops1. The next round of talks in the new 5+2 
format of negotiations held on 26-27 January 2006 had not brought any improve-
ment in the process of negotiations on the Transnistrian conflict, because Igor 
Ivanov, Russia’s Security Council Secretary, and Anatoly Kinakh, Ukraine’s Na-
tional Security and Defense Council (NSDC) Secretary had confirmed that their 
countries would continue to preserve a common view on the resolution of the con-
flict. Ukraine’s and Russia’s position differs substantially from the Moldovan and 
Western position and this fact is maintaining the inefficiency of the negotiations 
and represent the main cause of the poor results of the last two rounds of talks2. 
However Ukraine succeeded on the 3rd March to distance itself from such a posi-
tion and it finally had approved to implement the law on the control of the border. 
This change in the Ukraine’s position had largely occurred due to a more active in-
volvement of the European Union3. 
The negotiation process over the Transnistrian conflict didn’t yet provided a 
viable solution and the future of the negotiations will largely depend on how ac-
                                                    
1 Oazu NANTOI, Doi preşedinţi într-un bloc comun, 20 decembrie 2005, in http://www.ipp.md/ 
public/comentarii/42/ro/Putin%20+Iuscenko%2015.XII.20051.doc. 
2 Vladimir SOCOR, Moscow, Kyiv Disrupting Negotiations on Transnistria, in http://www. 
ucipr.kiev.ua/ index.php?newlang=eng. 
3 Flux, nr. 10 (538), 17 martie 2006; Timpul, Anul V, nr. 54 (329), 24 martie 2006. 
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tive would be the involvement of the United States and especially European Union 
in the new 5+2 format of the negotiations. 
Conclusions 
After a comprehensive analysis of the Transnistrian conflict and its mediation 
process it is necessary to explain why the resolution mechanisms of this conflict 
had failed to provide a final political settlement. 
The explanation of this failure resides in Russia’s implication in these mecha-
nisms. In almost all of these mechanisms Russia had a leading role in the process of 
mediation. Russia had assumed this leading role as a natural right which origi-
nates in Russia’s imperial policies that were perpetrated throughout centuries be-
ginning with the Russian Empire and continuing with the Soviet Union. Russian 
Federation had defined the region as ”near abroad”, a region which represents its 
special strategic interests and it falls under its sphere of influence. In order to pre-
serve the control over the former United Soviets’ space, Russian Federation had 
created the Commonwealth of Independent States which includes all the former 
Union republics except for the Baltic States. 
Russia’s interests were consistent with the maintenance of the de facto state as a 
means of controlling its respective governmental counterpart. Russia’s natural gas 
resources were effectively used as an instrument of control over Moldova because 
this state was dependent upon Russian gas resources. Thus Russia’s political inter-
ests were advanced through the use of economic means. 
Russia had clearly supported the separatist stance in the mediation process. 
Moreover, Russia had backed the separatists through offering them military sup-
port. In Transnistria Russia is backing the unconstitutional criminal regime 
through the maintenance in the region of the 14th Army. Russia had signed the 
Treaty on Conventional Forces in 1999 at OSCE Summit in Istanbul. The treaty and 
the final declaration had provided the unconditional withdrawal of the Russian 
troops from the Moldavian territory until the end of 2002. Russia did not pursue 
these commitments and it had constantly sought to delay the term of the with-
drawal. Thus, Russia continues to support the separatist Transnistria. 
At the beginning of the conflict Russia had contributed to the annulment of 
the quadripartite mechanism through its initiative of the bilateral talks with the 
Moldovan authorities. It was supposed that Russia had aimed first of all to exclude 
from the negotiation format the Romanian representatives, which were to support 
the Moldavian interests. Even if Russia was a participant of a mediation mecha-
nism in which OSCE representatives were included it had however remained in a 
leading position and this is largely due to the fact that it had the means to influ-
ence the OSCE decisions through its power of veto. OSCE, generally, is considered 
to be a very loose organization because it includes as much as fifty-five states. 
In 1997 when the five-sided format of the negotiations was established Russia 
had even succeeded to reserve to itself the right to be not just a simple mediator in 
this mechanism, but also a guarantor party. This right had also been acquired by 
Ukraine. As Ukraine was totally supporting the Russian stance, Russia could have 
continued its policy unhampered. The support for the Transnistrian authorities is 
also seen through the solutions which were submitted to the parties during the ne-
gotiation process. The OSCE Plan or the Kiev Proposal, which had envisaged the 
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creation of a federation, had some provisions which were to empower the Trans-
nistrian regime: the unification of the illegal Transnistrian forces with the Molda-
vian Army; a period of transition (an undetermined interval of time) for the estab-
lishment of the common currency and the control over the state borders; the Trans-
nistria’s participation in the conduct of foreign affairs that were to concern its inter-
ests; the language provision which could have raised the Russian language to the 
status of official language on Transnistrian territory; the system of guarantees pro-
vided by Russia, Ukraine and OSCE, which in fact could have brought the involve-
ment of these powers in the internal affairs of Moldova; and finally the equal num-
ber of votes in the Representative Chamber which actually entailed a veto power 
for the Transnistrian representatives. Even if it was said that the plan was drafted 
by OSCE it clearly had proved that Russians had decisively influenced the creation 
of this plan. The Kozak Memorandum, which was recognized as an exclusive Rus-
sian initiative, had more blatantly proved Russia’s support for the separatist re-
gime. It had envisaged the creation of a federation formed of two territorial units, 
Găgăuzia and Transnistria, and the remaining part of the Moldovan territory. The 
memorandum had legitimized the use of Russian language on the entire territory 
of the future federation. Besides this, the most controversial issues were the minor-
ity representation in the Senate of the future Parliament and in the Constitutional 
Court. In fact the Kozak Memorandum had envisaged an overrepresentation of the 
minority groups within these institutions and it had actually granted to the minori-
ties the right to hamper the implementation of any organic law. The Transnistrians 
which had realized that they were empowered by Russian support had even gone 
so far as to propose the inclusion in this draft the legitimization of the Russian 
troops in this region for a period of another thirty years. 
The Youshtchenko Plan was a Ukrainian initiative and it had confirmed the 
Ukraine’s support for the Russian stance because it contained some stipulations 
which were clearly unfavorable for Moldova. This plan had such stipulations as: 
the use of three official languages in Transnistria (Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrain-
ian languages); the Transnistria’s right to secession in the case Moldova looses its 
sovereignty and the creation of a system of guarantees which might have repre-
sented a basis for the future Russian or Ukrainian intervention in the Moldova’s in-
ternal affairs. The plan was also an actual recognition of the Transnistrian regime, 
because it had included Transnistria as a signatory party of this plan and also be-
cause the plan had provided the recognition of the newly elected Supreme Soviet. 
But, it however was not sure that this new Supreme Soviet would substantially dif-
fer from the previous one. These solutions were clearly unacceptable for the 
Moldovan side because they were only to bring the stabilization of the unconstitu-
tional regime. Thus, the failure of the mediation mechanisms can be explained by 
the fact that such mediators as Russia and Ukraine had clearly breached the im-
partiality clause. 
Transnistrian conflict is also having a problem with Russian ”peacekeeping” 
troops. These so-called peacekeepers are lacking any legal United Nations mandate 
and they for sure could not be considered as neutral forces because many of them 
had participated in the civil war on the separatist side. Moldova had recently be-
come more active in appealing to the international community for the replacement 
of these forces with multilateral peacekeeping forces. 
The above analysis proves the fact that a viable solution could only be 
obtained in the framework of a resolution mechanism in which the mediators are 
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impartial towards the conflicting parties. Thus, it can be concluded that the media-
tion mechanism in which Russia has a prominent role must be expanded as to in-
clude some other powerful mediators. Such an attempt was made by Moldova. 
The five-sided format of the negotiations was recently enlarged through the inclu-
sion of European Union’s and United States’ observers. However the status of an 
observer can’t be compared with the guarantor or mediator status. This fact conse-
quently raises the question if this mechanism will really succeed to promote a vi-
able solution. The Transnistrian conflict also largely depends on the withdrawal of 
the Russian army. 
This conflict could be solved if the following measures would be applied: 
–  the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Moldova; 
–  the establishment of international peacekeeping troops and consequently 
the replacement of the Russian peacekeeping troops; 
–  and finally a more active reliance on the peace-building measures, which in 
this had registered a rather poor record. 
